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TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY REGULATION:
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
FRANCESCA BIGNAMI*
GIORGIO RESTA**
I
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory differences in the data privacy arena have been a recurring source
of contention in transatlantic trade relations. In the 1990s, the focus was primarily
on differences in the rules governing market actors. Over the past decade,
however, the focus has expanded to include the public sector and the policies
regulating the collection and use of personal data by government actors,
particularly national security agencies. This article surveys the considerable
history of transatlantic relations in the privacy area and the attempts that have
been made to reconcile legal and policy differences in the interest of trade
liberalization and police and national security cooperation. It then turns to the
current dispute over National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance and discusses
the factual and legal underpinnings of the dispute. The article demonstrates how
this latest episode in transatlantic privacy both underscores longstanding legal
differences and reveals fresh ones. The article concludes with observations
regarding the impact of the NSA dispute on transatlantic privacy relations and on
trade relations more broadly speaking.
II
HISTORY OF DATA PRIVACY IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
A. Regulatory Differences and Similarities
In narrating the history of data privacy, the point of departure is generally
taken to be the Code of Fair Information Practices set forth in an expert report
commissioned by the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
and published in 1973.1 To understand the current transatlantic dispute, however,
it bears taking one step back, to begin with the judgment of the German
Copyright © 2015 by Francesca Bignami & Giorgio Resta.
This article is also available at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor, George Washington University Law School. We thank Ira Rubinstein and the other
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1. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA
SYS., RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973).
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Constitutional Court in the Microcensus case. In 1969, the Court found that the
personal information collected in large data banks was constitutionally protected
under Articles 1 and 2 of the Basic Law (human dignity and the free development
of personality).2 That litigation involved a challenge to the federal census, which
the Court ultimately upheld, but only on condition that the information remain
anonymous.3 This early case was followed, over ten years later, by the celebrated
Census Act case in which the Court recognized a broad “right of informational selfdetermination (“informationelles Selbstbestimmungsrecht”).4 With the right of
informational self-determination, the Court significantly extended its earlier
jurisprudence. The Court recognized that the right of informational selfdetermination covered all personal information, and it abandoned the distinction
that had been made in the Microcensus case between private information and
information in the public domain. The Court also stated that the right came into
being at the time of collection—at the moment that the individual was asked to
give up the information—and not simply once it was used or misused by state
actors and other types of data processors.
The extraordinary possibilities of modern information technologies
underpinned this conceptualization of the right of informational selfdetermination. In language reminiscent of a recent report by the United States
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,5 the German Court wrote in 1983 that
[t]he [individual’s decisional] authority needs special protection in view of the present
and prospective conditions of automatic data processing. It is particularly endangered
because . . . the technical means of storing highly personalized information about
particular persons today are practically unlimited, and [information] can be retrieved in
a matter of seconds with the aid of automatic data processing, irrespective of distance.
Furthermore, such information can be joined to other data collections—particularly
when constructing integrated information systems—to produce a partial or virtually
complete personality profile, with the person concerned having insufficient means of
controlling either its veracity or its use.6

In the Census Act case, the Court also expanded on the test that applies to all
measures that interfere with basic rights, including privacy. Generally speaking,
any interference with one of the rights protected under the Basic Law must be
authorized by parliamentary law, serve a legitimate purpose, and satisfy the
proportionality test, i.e. suitability, necessity, and proportionality stricto sensu.7 In
the case of the right of informational self-determination, the Court further
2. Microcensus Case, 27 BVerfGE 1 (1969), translated and reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL
A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 356–58 (3d ed. 2012).
3. See generally id.
4. Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1, Dec. 15, 1983, translated and reprinted in DONALD P. KOMMERS &
RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 408–09 (3d ed.
2012).
5. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM CONDUCTED
UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014) [hereinafter REPORT ON USA PATRIOT ACT].
6. Census Act Case, 65 BVerfGE 1 (1983), supra note 4, at 409.
7

DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 67 (3d ed. 2012).
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specified that the legislative basis for personal data processing must be clear and
precise and that, to satisfy proportionality, there must be organizational and
procedural safeguards capable of preventing infringements of the right8
This constitutional frame has shaped both the jurisprudence of other
constitutional courts—in particular the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)—as well as positive
lawmaking in Germany and at the European level. Both the ECtHR and the
European Court of Justice have recognized that the right to privacy, guaranteed
under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, covers personal data
and is triggered whenever public or private entities gather information that can be
associated with an individual.9 Both courts use the same the jurisprudential
framework of (1) a basis in law, (2) clearly defined, legitimate purposes, and (3)
proportionality to analyze data-protection challenges, as will be discussed in
connection with NSA surveillance.
In the legislative sphere, the fundamental right to data privacy has shaped the
design of data-protection legislation in most European jurisdictions. Within
Germany, the Court’s first judgment in the Microcensus case provided much of the
impetus for the first federal data-protection law. A small coalition party, the Free
Democratic Party, took on the issue of new technologies and democracy, and,
drawing on the case and the work of a number of prominent legal scholars, pressed
for privacy legislation.10 A government bill was introduced in May 1973, and after
a long series of parliamentary debates, mostly centered on the extent of privatesector coverage and the design of the enforcement system, a federal law was finally
passed in January 1977.11 That law—together with a series of sectoral laws specific
to areas such as telecommunications and the police—served as the
constitutionally required legislative act authorizing the interference with the right
to privacy. The law set down the conditions for the use and sharing of personal
information, most of which turned on the proportionality requirement that the
data processor handle the information only insofar as “necessary” to accomplish
the original purpose of the data operation.12 Further, it established a legal

8. Id. at 410–11.
9. See, e.g., Amann v. Switzerland, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. 843, 858 (2000). Since the entry into force of the
Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the right to privacy is protected under Article 7 of the European Charter of
Fundamental Rights and the right to personal data protection is recognized specifically under Article 8 of
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
10. See, e.g., ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, PROTECTORS OF PRIVACY: REGULATING PERSONAL DATA IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 51–52, 63–69 (2008) (describing the role of Free Democratic Party); Klaus Flachmann,
Kreditwirtschaft und Datenschutz, 26 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DAS GESAMTE KREDITWESEN 56 (1973) (noting and
criticizing role of legal academics and the theoretical tenor of the policy debates); Spiros Simitis, Chancen
un Gefahren der elektronischen Datenverarbeitung, 16 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 673, 675, (1971)
(providing an example of legal scholarship); Steinmuller/Lutterbeck/Mallmann/Harbort/Kolb/Schneider,
Grundfragen des Datenschutze Gutachten im Auftrag des Bundesmnisteriums des Innern, July 1971 (BTDrucksache VI/3826) (legal scholarship).
11. COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE
UNITED STATES 77–90 (1992); DAVID FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE SOCIETIES: THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, SWEDEN, FRANCE, CANADA, AND THE UNITED STATES 22–24 (1989).
12. Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], 1977.
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framework for oversight and enforcement.13
The Court’s second judgment in the Census Act case also triggered
parliamentary action, resulting in a series of amendments to the federal dataprotection law in 1990.14 In line with that case, some of the amendments were
designed to extend privacy rights to the entire gamut of data processing activities:
for instance, in the public sector, the collection of personal data—not simply the
storage and use of personal data—was regulated for the first time.15 Other
amendments were designed to improve enforcement of the right: the
independence of the Federal Data Protection Commissioner was improved,16 state
authorities acquired new enforcement powers,17 individuals were expressly given
the right to vindicate their privacy rights in court, and the rules on proving
damages were relaxed for lawsuits brought against both private and public
bodies.18
Turning to the positive law at the European level, both the Council of Europe
Convention 108 (Convention 108) and the EU Data Protection Directive were
shaped by the rights framework. This is particularly clear in the Directive,
proposed in 1990 and adopted in 1995.19 Although the Directive was based on the
market harmonization competence in the EC Treaty, designed to facilitate data
flows and trade in Europe, it was essentially conceived as a measure that would
improve protection of the fundamental right to privacy throughout Europe.20 The
main proponents of the Directive were national data-protection officials with a
mission to safeguard the right to privacy, and they ensured that the purpose,
structure, and text of the Directive were rooted in the logic of rights.21 Thus the
Directive declared as its object that the “member states shall protect the
fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right
to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data.”22 In line with the
constitutional law on rights, the Directive serves as the law that authorizes the
interference with the right to privacy implicated by any collection and use of
personal information and, in accordance with the constitutional duty of clarity and
precision, it sets down the exhaustive list of purposes for which such interference
is allowed.23 And it satisfies the constitutional requirement of proportionality by
limiting data processing to that which is necessary to accomplish the stated

13. BDSG, 1977 §§ 17–42; BENNETT, supra note 11, at 180; FLAHERTY, supra note 11, at 25.
14. BDSG, 1990.
15. See id. at § 13.
16. See id. at § 22(1).
17. See id. at § 38(5).
18. See id. at § 8.
19. EP and Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
20. See Francesca Bignami, Transgovernmental Networks vs. Democracy: The Case of the European
Information Privacy Network, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 807, 834–44 (2005) [hereinafter Transgovernmental
Networks].
21. See NEWMAN, supra note 10, at 74.
22. EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, art. 1.
23. Id. art. 7.
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purpose and by establishing a set of organizational and procedural guarantees to
protect against privacy violations.24
Turning to the United States, there it is indeed appropriate to begin the
historical account of data privacy with the Code of Fair Information Practices. This
included a number of principles that remain prominent in contemporary privacy
law: transparency in the use and processing of data; an individual right of access
to and, if appropriate, correction of personal data; the duty (on the part of data
users) to ensure the accuracy of personal data; the obligation to adopt security
measures to prevent fraudulent uses of data; and a limitation on uses to the
purposes for which the personal information was originally collected.25 The Fair
Information Practices were adopted in the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 and in
numerous sector-specific U.S. laws.26 When, in 1980, a set of data-protection
guidelines was adopted by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, a number of the American legal principles were included.27 These
guidelines, in turn, influenced the negotiations on Convention 108.28 And today,
they are reflected in national privacy regulation in Europe, which give prominence
to transparency, access, accuracy, security, and use limitations.
Even though widespread adoption of Fair Information Practices has produced
significant convergence in this policy area, not only between the United States and
Europe but among jurisdictions globally, the historical trajectory on the American
side of the Atlantic has also followed a distinctive path that has generated
regulatory conflict with Europe and has given rise to a series of diplomatic efforts
to render the two systems compatible. The first significant difference was and
continues to be the absence of constitutionalization of the policy area. Even though
the periodic expert reports that have been commissioned in response to public
concern over information technologies have generally canvassed the
constitutional law in the domain of privacy and have underscored the importance
of privacy for liberal values, they have all stopped short of recognizing that there
is, or should be, a constitutional right to data privacy.29 The failure to reach such a
conclusion is understandable because the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not
squarely support such a conclusion. All of the older cases suggest that such a right
does not exist,30 and even though the most recent decisions of the Court in the area
indicate that the tide might be turning in light of the dramatic developments that
have occurred in digital technologies, there still does not appear to be a solid
24. See Francesca Bignami, Cooperative Legalism and the Non-Americanization of European Regulatory
Styles: The Case of Data Privacy, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 411, 435–41 (2011) [hereinafter Cooperative Legalism].
25. RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 1, at 33–46.
26. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 655–60 (2009).
27. See Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t
Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8.
28. See COLIN J. BENNETT & CHARLES D. RAAB, THE GOVERNANCE OF PRIVACY: POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE 75 (2003).
29. For recent examples, see generally LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
(2013) [hereinafter LIBERTY AND SECURITY]; REPORT ON USA PATRIOT ACT, supra note 5.
30. See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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majority in favor of a constitutional right to data privacy.31
The second difference, related to the first, is the more limited safeguards for
privacy in positive law. This is evident across a number of legislative enactments
and, to use the constitutional framework described earlier, takes two primary
forms. First, the substantive limits on collection, use, sharing, and retention of data
that are loosely connected to the proportionality requirement of necessity are
generally more relaxed in the United States than in Europe.32 To grossly
oversimplify, in U.S. law, more information—from the collection phase to the
erasure phase—is generally viewed as better than less information. Therefore,
although U.S. and European law share similar commitments to transparency of
databases, access to and correction of one’s personal data, reliability of personal
information, and digital security, U.S. law contains fewer restrictions on how much
personal data may be collected, how such data may be used, and how long that
data may be kept. Second, in the United States, the enforcement of privacy law is
largely entrusted to private litigants and courts, not administrative agencies. This
is especially true for privacy regulation of the public sector, which lacks a powerful
set of administrative overseers comparable to European data-protection
authorities.33 The importance of courts, as opposed to administrative agencies, in
the U.S. regulatory scheme has undermined public oversight because of the
difficulty of analogizing privacy harms to traditional torts and the many doctrinal
obstacles this has created for litigants seeking redress through the courts.34
To illustrate briefly the more limited statutory safeguards for privacy under
U.S law, compare the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974 with the Council of Europe’s
Convention 108. The Privacy Act regulates the government’s collection, use, and
disclosure of all types of personal information. It contains the familiar
transparency, access and correction, reliability, and security principles. However,
there are relatively few substantive limits on what can be done with personal
information. Agencies can collect any personal information that is relevant and
necessary to the agency’s legal purposes set down by congressional statute or
presidential executive order.35 The only type of personal information that requires
special justification to be collected is personal data “describing how any individual
exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment [right to freedom of
expression and freedom of association]”36 as opposed to the numerous categories
of information considered to be sensitive in Convention 108, including racial
31. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012).
32. See, e.g., FRANCESCA BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM ON DATA PROTECTION IN THE FIELD OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT: SAFEGUARDS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES FOR EU CITIZENS 36 (2015) [hereinafter BIGNAMI, THE US
LEGAL
SYSTEM],
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pdf
.
33. Cooperative Legalism, supra note 24, at 419.
34. Francesca Bignami, European versus American Liberty: A Comparative Analysis of Antiterrorism
Data Mining, 48 B.C. L. REV. 609, 684–86 (2007) [hereinafter European versus American Liberty].
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2012).
36. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7).
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origin, criminal convictions, and health information.37 Although the Privacy Act
generally prohibits sharing with other government agencies without the consent
of the individual involved, it makes a broad exception for “routine uses” disclosed
to the public at the time the record system is created.38 In contrast with the
Convention, which says that personal data shall be “preserved in a form which
permits identification of the data subjects for no longer than is required for the
purposes for which those data are stored,”39 the Privacy Act contains no provision
regulating the length of data retention. Last, in the case of intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, most of these substantive requirements can be avoided if,
at the time that legal notice of the database is given (part of the transparency duty),
the agency claims the exemptions available under the Act.40 On the question of
oversight, the Privacy Act confines enforcement to litigation and the courts: it gives
individuals the right to sue the government for damages and, in some instances, to
receive injunctive relief.41 Government officials may also be criminally prosecuted
for certain violations of the Privacy Act.42 Although the original bill would have
established an independent commission tasked with enforcement, similar to the
model that took root in Europe in the 1970s, it was removed in the end as part of
the compromise necessary to pass the Privacy Act.43
The third significant transatlantic difference that emerged early on and that
persists still today is the absence, in the United States, of a comprehensive, privacy
law applicable to the private sector. Like an independent commission, regulation
of the private sector was proposed in the early days of the policy area: the original
version of the Privacy Act would have regulated personal data processing in both
the public and private sectors.44 The Watergate scandal, however, was fresh in the
minds of lawmakers, and the prospect of a government Big Brother was their
principal fear.45 For their part, industry groups and many privacy experts
successfully opposed comprehensive privacy regulation on the grounds that it was
too early to discern which kinds of privacy problems would emerge in the private
sector.46 They also argued that the diverse circumstances of various economic
sectors would be handled best in tailored, sector-specific statutes rather than in a
cross-cutting piece of legislation.47 Therefore, even though privacy statutes have
been enacted to regulate a wide array of market sectors—banking,
telecommunications, health care, credit reporting, and so on—there is no single
37. See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data, no. 108 (Jan. 28, 1981), art. 6 [hereinafter Convention 108].
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
39. Convention 108, supra note 37, art. 5e.
40. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)–(k).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g).
42. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i).
43. See S. 3148, 93d Cong. (1974) (original version with privacy commission); Privacy Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (version without privacy commission); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY
ACT OF 1974 at 119–24 (1976), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LH_privacy_act-1974.pdf.
44. S. 3418, 93d Cong. § 201 (1974).
45. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, supra note 43, at 4, 832, 893.
46. See, e.g., id. at 68.
47. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 19–20 (1974).
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omnibus law capable of capturing the data practices, sectors, and emerging
technologies that fall in between the cracks of the individual statutes.48
B. Regulatory Conflict and Cooperation
Although many aspects of European and U.S. privacy regulation are being
debated at present and may change in the near future, the deep-seated differences
analyzed in the previous section are unlikely to disappear anytime soon and are
vital to understanding the regulatory conflicts and attempts at harmonization of
the past twenty years. Conflict with the United States has involved largely the
European Union as opposed to individual member states. When privacy regulation
first became a salient issue in transatlantic relations, in the mid-1990s, attention
was mostly focused on the private sector and market actors. By the mid-2000s,
however, U.S. government actors also came under scrutiny for their use of
personal data to screen for suspected security threats as well as related criminal
offenses. The following narrates both sets of disputes through to the revelations of
NSA surveillance in summer 2013.
1. Regulation of the Market: Safe Harbor
The divergent U.S. and EU approaches to privacy regulation first emerged as a
salient problem and a potential threat to transatlantic trade in the mid-1990s. Like
many of the early national data-protection laws that had preceded it, the 1995 EU
Directive contained a blocking provision that required national authorities to
prohibit data transfers to jurisdictions without adequate privacy guarantees.49 In
view of the lack of comprehensive marketplace regulation in the United States, U.S.
firms with European operations feared that the U.S. legal framework would not be
considered adequate and that, as a result, data transfers from Europe to the United
States would be deemed illegal.50 In response, the U.S. Department of Commerce
initiated negotiations with the European Commission and the two sides reached
an agreement on “Safe Harbor” privacy principles that, if adopted by U.S.
organizations, would entitle those organizations to a presumption of “adequacy”
under the Directive.51 The Safe Harbor agreement took effect in 2000, as did the
Commission decision granting those firms that adhered to the Safe Harbor
principles an adequacy finding.52 Under the Safe Harbor agreement, the legal basis
for collecting and using personal information is consent. Consent is assured by
giving the consumer “notice” of personal data practices and by allowing the
consumer “choice” respecting disclosures to third parties and uses of personal
48. Examples of sector-specific statutes include the Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630
(1978), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012), and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
49. EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, arts. 25–26.
50. See Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules
in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 69–79 (2000).
51. See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission, 65 Fed. Reg.
45666-01 (July 24, 2000).
52. Id.
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data that are incompatible with the original purpose of data collection. The Safe
Harbor principles, in line with the Fair Information Practices discussed earlier,
also include a right of individual access and correction, data security, limitations
on use and data transfers, and independent dispute settlement as an enforcement
mechanism. Firms that wish to invoke Safe Harbor must incorporate these
principles in their privacy policy, make their privacy policy public and ensure that
it is readily available to consumers, and self-certify their adherence to Safe Harbor
on an annual basis with the Department of Commerce.53 Since firms hold
themselves out as subscribing to the Safe Harbor principles, a violation of the
principles can be sanctioned by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) under its
powers to bring enforcement actions against unfair or deceptive acts or
practices.54
There has been considerable debate over the effectiveness of Safe Harbor, both
as a vehicle for bringing U.S. corporate practices into line with EU law and as a tool
for safeguarding consumer privacy. In the first years after Safe Harbor came into
force, relatively few firms signed up, but today over 3,200 have self-certified with
the Department of Commerce.55 Although a number of observers have called into
question whether the firms that hold themselves out as complying actually do so,
the FTC has recently begun taking a more proactive approach to enforcement. The
well-publicized settlement orders against Google, Facebook, and Myspace all
included Safe Harbor counts.56 Additionally, the FTC has brought over a dozen
enforcement actions against firms that claimed Safe Harbor membership but failed
to renew their self-certification with the Department of Commerce.57
More broadly, there has been skepticism over whether consent—that is, notice
and choice—operates as an effective device for safeguarding privacy. This
skepticism applies not only to Safe Harbor but to U.S. and EU privacy regulation
broadly speaking, which also rely heavily on consent.58 The privacy notices, which
describe what will be done with personal information, are unwieldy,
incomprehensible, and generally go unread by consumers. Even if privacy notices
were comprehensible and effective disclosure might therefore exist, consumer
choice is significantly limited by the very expansive interpretation of what uses are
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the
Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of the EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU,
at 4, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Safe Harbor].
56. Complaint at 8, MySpace LLC, FTC File No. 102 3058, No. C-4369 (F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2012); Complaint
at 19, Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092 3184, No. C-4365 (F.T.C. July 27, 2012); Complaint at 7, Google Inc.,
FTC File No. 102 3136, No. C-4336 (F.T.C. Oct. 13, 2011).
57. See orders referenced at https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/06/ftcapproves-final-orders-settling-charges-us-eu-safe-harbor; and orders referenced in www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-approves-final-orders-us-eu-safe-harbor-cases.
58. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PROTECTION
IN THE ‘INFORMATION ECONOMY’ 343 (Jane I. Winn ed., 2006); WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A
NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL
ECONOMY 15, 21 (2012) (discussing guarantees above and beyond notice and choice entailed by the rights
of
“Respect
for
Context”
and
“Focused
Collection”), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
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“compatible” with the original purposes of data collection and the difficulty of
navigating electronic disclosures to opt out of those uses and third-party transfers
that are “incompatible.” Furthermore, consumers are generally unable to choose
among vendors based on their privacy practices because of the absence of
significant differences in vendor policies. Overall, therefore, as a mode of policy
coordination and regulatory cooperation in the context of a globalized data
economy and multiple legal jurisdictions, Safe Harbor has proven quite successful.
As a device for protecting consumer privacy, however, it has been less effective.
Policy thinking has evolved considerably since the Safe Harbor agreement was
negotiated over a decade ago and therefore it might very well be necessary to
change the principles contained in Safe Harbor to assure adequate safeguards for
privacy.
The Safe Harbor agreement has recently been undone for reasons quite
different from the consumer privacy concerns that originally motivated the
agreement.59 As revealed by Snowden, U.S. Internet companies afford national
security agencies extensive access to the personal information of their clients.
However, the Safe Harbor agreement and the accompanying Commission
adequacy decision are almost entirely focused on market actors and the privacy
safeguards that apply when they handle consumer data. The legal instruments
have virtually nothing to say on the law that applies when the U.S. government
seeks access to consumer data and whether that law is adequate from the
perspective of EU law. As a result, as will be discussed at greater length later in this
article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has found that Safe
Harbor can no longer be used as a legal basis for data transfers from the EU to the
U.S.
2. Regulation of Government Actors: PNR and SWIFT
Shortly after 9/11, the EU and the United States became mired in a separate
set of privacy conflicts—U.S. government access to EU airline passenger data and
EU financial transactions data.60 This set of regulatory conflicts, unlike Safe
Harbor, involved the public sector, specifically government agencies with
responsibilities in the field of national security and criminal law. Many of the same
regulatory differences that triggered the earlier dispute over the private sector
were on display in this second round—the different definitions of permissible
personal data processing and the absence, in the United States, of an independent
enforcement agency—but were somewhat more surprising given the relatively
robust nature of public sector regulation in the United States. As compared to the
private sector, there is comprehensive statutory regulation of government
actors—namely, the Privacy Act—and there exists a constitutional right to privacy
against intrusive government surveillance. As already discussed, however, U.S.
constitutional law is largely silent on the right to data privacy and the guarantees
of U.S. statutory law are limited in the area of national security and law
59. See infra text accompanying notes 180–82.
60. See generally European versus American Liberty, supra note 34, at 668–74.
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enforcement, a trend that has been exacerbated by the post-9/11 political climate.
To understand the contours of this second round of regulatory conflict, it is
necessary to first address the jurisdictional issue of how the regulation of police
and national security agencies in the United States came to be part of the EU
agenda. There are two parts to the answer. First, privacy regulation of the
government and the market is interrelated, given that the government is a major
user of personal information collected by private entities. Under the EU Directive
and Safe Harbor, firms may disclose information to public actors, including law
enforcement and national security agencies, if required to do so by law.61 In the
case of European governments, which are subject to a fundamental right to
personal data protection and to omnibus data-protection laws, the government’s
collection of personal data must be based on a clear and precise legal authority and
must respect the proportionality principle. When a non-European state requests
such information from firms operating within its jurisdiction, and the request is
not in line with the guarantees of European data-protection law, then the privacy
safeguards for the data in the foreign jurisdiction might not be considered
“adequate” In such a case, the data transfer is unlawful under Article 25 of the
Directive and European authorities are empowered to take action to either block
such transfers or to negotiate agreements that establish the appropriate
safeguards in the foreign jurisdiction. The second explanation for the public-sector
dimension to the U.S.–EU regulatory dispute is more straightforward: the powers
of the EU have progressively expanded to include police, justice, and
immigration.62 After the most recent round of treaty amendments contained in the
Lisbon Treaty, these areas are squarely within the jurisdiction of the EU
institutions.63
In response to 9/11, the U.S. government embarked on an aggressive campaign
to collect, pool, and analyze data with possible national security implications, and
one of the casualties of this campaign has been a series of transatlantic disputes
over the personal data of European citizens. The first involved the passenger name
records (PNR) collected by airlines. After 9/11, the U.S. authorities began
requiring that all airline carriers submit the PNR data for flights to, from, or
through the United States. Given the breadth of the U.S. program—the amount of
information involved, the extensive sharing among government agencies, and the
unclear privacy safeguards—a number of European air carriers approached the
European Commission for guidance on how to satisfy their EU Directive obligation
to safeguard the privacy of data transferred to third countries.64 The significant
regulatory differences between the EU and the United States—this time in the
public domain—triggered lengthy negotiations over an agreement that would
satisfy both security and privacy concerns. The two sides finally reached a deal in
2004.65 There have been three successive PNR agreements: The original 2004
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See EP and Council Directive 95/46, supra note 19, art. 7(c); Safe Harbor, supra note 55, Annex 1.
See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 923–56 (5th ed. 2011).
See id. at 24–28.
Transgovernmental Networks, supra note 20, at 862.
Id. at 864–65.
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agreement; its 2007 replacement; and the agreement currently in force, from
2012.66
Especially on the European side, the adequacy of the privacy safeguards
afforded by the PNR agreements has been and continues to be contested by a
number of institutional actors, including the European Parliament, the European
Data Protection Supervisor, and the Article 29 Working Party.67 Compared to Safe
Harbor, this dispute has festered longer. At least part of this acrimony can be
attributed to post-9/11 politics and the fairly intransigent stance of successive U.S.
administrations on security-related matters.
The terms of cooperation set down under the current EU–U.S. PNR agreement
cover the familiar privacy categories of transparency, individual access and
correction, security, enforcement, and proportionality (which includes purpose,
amount of data collected, sensitive data, retention of data, and data sharing).68
Before turning to proportionality and enforcement—the two major points of
transatlantic difference reviewed earlier in this article and the source of most of
the conflict in the PNR negotiations—it is worthwhile mentioning individual
access and correction, since it raises issues that have also become prominent in
the NSA surveillance controversy. European policymakers have long been
perplexed by the exclusion of non-U.S. persons, that is, persons who are not U.S.
citizens or legal permanent residents, from coverage under the Privacy Act of
1974. As will be explained below, this differential treatment of U.S. and EU persons
has since come to the fore in the context of NSA surveillance because it also marks
privacy guarantees in the national security domain. The exclusion of non-U.S.
persons from the Privacy Act is important for the access and correction principle
because it prevents Europeans from exercising access rights under that legislation.

66. Commission Decision 2004/535, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11; Agreement between the European Union
and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by
Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 2007 O.J. (L 204) 18; Agreement
between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of Passenger Name
Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2012 O.J. (L 215) 5 [hereinafter 2012
Agreement].
67. See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 5/2007 on the Follow-up Agreement between the
European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record
(PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security Concluded in July 2007
(Aug. 17, 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2007/wp138_en.pdf; Letter from Article 29 Working Party to Member of the LIBE
Committee of the European Parliament, Brussels, Ref. Ares (2012)15841-06/01/2012; European Data
Protection Supervisor, Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement
between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of Passenger Name
Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2012/C 35/03 (Sept. 2, 2012).
68. 2012 Agreement, supra note 66. For a general description of the operation of the program, see
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Joint Review of the
Implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security
Accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council on the Joint
Review of the Implementation of the Agreement between the European Union and the United States of
America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of
Homeland Security, COM (2013) 844 final (Nov. 27, 2013).
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The EU–U.S. agreement, therefore, specifies that the Freedom of Information Act
is to be used to obtain the information contained in the PNR held by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Returning to proportionality and enforcement, the purposes of PNR data
processing are limited mostly to preventing and prosecuting terrorist offenses and
transnational crimes punishable by imprisonment of three years or more.
Nineteen types of PNR data can be requested, and the transmission from the air
carrier to DHS occurs via a “push” system, meaning that the carrier transmits the
required data into DHS’s database.69 The “push” system is designed to reduce the
risk that irrelevant data will be collected, which can occur when DHS is authorized
to extract the PNR directly from the carrier’s reservation system through what is
known as a “pull” system.70 Sensitive data—in the PNR context, often religious
affiliation revealed by meal preferences—can only be used under exceptional
circumstances and are generally deleted after thirty days. PNR data are retained
for fifteen years—five years in an “active” database and ten years in a “dormant”
database—after which time they are anonymized; if data are used for a specific
case or investigation they may be retained as long as necessary.71 Sharing this data
with other domestic government agencies is allowed only for the counterterrorism
and law enforcement purposes authorized by the agreement and even then, only
“in support of those cases under examination or investigation.”72 Presumably,
therefore, sharing does not occur in bulk, but rather only with reference to specific
individuals or events being investigated. As for enforcement and oversight, the
DHS Privacy Office is tasked with primary responsibility, but the agreement also
mentions other “Department Privacy Officers,” the DHS Office of Inspector
General, the Government Accountability Office, and the United States Congress.73
In 2006, the second major dispute over privacy regulation of government
actors emerged, this time over access to and use of financial data. Since 9/11, the
United States Treasury Department, under a program known as the Terrorist
Finance Tracking Program (TFTP), had been collecting vast quantities of financial
data on bank transfers and other types of operations from the Belgian private
entity the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
(SWIFT).74 SWIFT is the largest financial telecommunications network in the
world and is the system used to execute and record most interbank transactions.
Although it is established in Belgium, it had two operational servers, one in the
Netherlands and a mirror server in the United States. Because of its presence in
the United States, SWIFT was subject to the administrative subpoena power of the
69. Id. at 14.
70. See, e.g., Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 7/2010 on European Commission’s Communication on
the Global Approach to Transfers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data to Third Countries, at 6 (Nov. 12,
2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinionrecommendation/files/2010/wp178_en.pdf.
71. 2012 Agreement, supra note 66, at 8 (art. 8).
72. Id. at 10 (art. 16).
73. Id. at 10 (art. 14).
74. For an account of the initial stages of the TFTP dispute, see European versus American Liberty,
supra note 34, at 672–74.
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Department of Treasury, which is authorized to request financial information for
counterterrorism purposes. But because SWIFT is established in Belgium and the
vast majority of the data in the U.S. mirror server originated in the EU, SWIFT was
also clearly subject to European privacy law and the duty under that law to ensure
that privacy would be respected upon the transfer of that data to third countries.
In fact, from the beginning, SWIFT knew that it was running the risk of violating
European privacy law. Because it was prohibited under the terms of the
administrative subpoena from disclosing the data transfers, SWIFT requested and
received a “comfort letter” from the Department of Treasury in which the
Department pledged to support SWIFT in the event that it was later sued by
foreign governments or third parties.
When the TFTP was revealed in 2006, the European Parliament and European
data-protection authorities strongly condemned the U.S. government for secretly
and indiscriminately collecting the private financial records of millions of
Europeans. Both the Belgian data-protection authority and the Article 29 Working
Party found that SWIFT had violated European privacy law.75 The European
Commission and the U.S. Department of Treasury subsequently entered into
discussions to assuage European privacy concerns. The result was a number of
Treasury representations laying out the scope of the privacy guarantees built into
the TFTP and an agreement allowing an “eminent European person” appointed by
the Commission to conduct periodic reviews to ensure that Treasury had complied
with its representations.76 Although this oversight system did indeed result in two
largely favorable reports to the Commission by the French magistrate Jean-Louis
Bruguière,77 it was soon taken over by events: SWIFT announced in 2007 that it
planned to establish a new operating center in Switzerland by 2009 so that intraEuropean bank messages could be stored exclusively in Europe.78 It therefore
became urgent for the U.S. government to reach a deal with the EU to assure
continued access to European financial transaction data once those data were
75. Belgian Data Protection Commission, Opinion No. 37/2006 of 27 Sept. 2006 on the Transfer of
Personal Data by the CSLF SWIFT by Virtue of UST (OFAC) Subpoenas, at 26–27,
http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2644.pdf; Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 10/2006 on
the Processing of Personal Data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication
(SWIFT)
(Nov.
22,
2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2006/wp128_en.pdf.
76. Notice: Publication of U.S./EU Exchange of Letters and Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
Representations of the United States Department of the Treasury, 72 Fed. Reg. 60054-02 (Oct. 23, 2007).
77. Commission Report on the Joint Review of the Implementation of the Agreement between the
European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial Messaging Data
from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
(Mar. 13, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/commission-report-on-thejoint-review-of-the-tftp.pdf; Report on the Second Joint Review of the Implementation of the Agreement
between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Financial
Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program (Dec. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Report on Implementation of Agreement],
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/20121214_joint_review_report_tftp_en.pdf.
78. Andre R. Jaglom, Internet Distribution, E-Commerce and Other Computer Related Issues: Current
Developments in Liability On-Line, Business Methods Patents and Software Distribution, Licensing and
Copyright Protection Questions, SW041 ALI-CLE 687, 668–69 (2015).
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physically removed from the United States and were therefore no longer subject
to the U.S. administrative subpoena power. The first agreement, signed in 2009,
was voted down by the European Parliament largely in reaction to what was
perceived as a move by the Council and Commission to circumvent the
Parliament’s new powers in the areas of police and judicial cooperation and
external relations after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.79 The second EU–
U.S. agreement (TFTP II), signed and ratified in summer 2010, is the agreement
currently in force.80
Similar to the PNR agreement, the privacy guarantees in TFTP II can be
grouped into transparency; individual access and correction; security;
enforcement; and proportionality, which includes purpose, amount of data
collected, sensitive data, retention of data, and data sharing. The procedure
outlined under the agreement requires that the Treasury issue requests for data—
generally categories of data—that are “necessary” for purposes of prevention,
investigation, detection or prosecution of terrorism or terrorist financing and that
are “tailored as narrowly as possible to minimise the amount of data requested.”81
Such requests are issued to SWIFT and to Europol, which must review the request
for compliance with proportionality before SWIFT can release the data.82 Once the
Treasury receives the data, it may only conduct individualized searches—not data
mining—and only when it suspects that the subject in question has a “nexus to
terrorism or its financing.”83 Although the agreement recognizes a category of
“sensitive data,” it anticipates that the financial transaction data will rarely, if ever,
implicate sensitive data; most likely for this reason, the agreement does not specify
the special precautions that would be taken in the unlikely event that sensitive
data were generated.84 Retention periods differ for “extracted” and “nonextracted” data—non-extracted data are to be deleted after five years, whereas
extracted data can be retained for as long as necessary for the specific
investigation or prosecution for which they are used.85 The information extracted
in individualized searches may be shared with other law enforcement and national
security agencies “for lead purpose only and for the exclusive purpose of the
investigation, detection, prevention, or prosecution of terrorism or its financing.”86
Similar to PNR, oversight is entrusted primarily to the Privacy Office, this time in
the Treasury Department.
Even more so than the PNR agreement, TFTP II has failed to allay European
privacy concerns and has been the object of repeated criticism by
79. European Parliament Press Release, SWIFT: European Parliament Votes Down Agreement with the
US (Nov. 2, 2010).
80. Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the Processing and
Transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the Purposes of the
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 5 [hereinafter 2010 Agreement].
81. Id. at 8 (art. 4.2.(c)).
82. Id. at 8 (art. 4.4).
83. Id. at 9 (art. 5.6).
84. Id. at 9 (art. 5.7).
85. Id. at 9 (art. 6).
86. Id. at 9 (art. 7).
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parliamentarians and European data-protection authorities.87 This can be
explained by virtue of the sheer volume of personal data entailed and the secretive
nature of the program. Whereas passenger name records are relatively discrete
data points, linked to a specific person and flight, the requests made under TFTP
II are drawn broadly so as to capture possible terrorist financing. Moreover,
whereas individuals may experience fairly immediate consequences from PNR—
for instance, repeated secondary screening on entry in the United States, which
may give rise to the access, correction, and oversight procedures outlined in the
agreement—the financial data used in TFTP will generally only trigger visible
government action when the individual is apprehended or prosecuted, making
those provisions largely theoretical. Finally, transparency is particularly
challenging in the TFTP context: the Treasury has argued that the effectiveness of
the program would be undermined by the disclosure of the terms used to extract
the data or the number of investigations supported by the financial data.88
To conclude this discussion, it is important to note one element of transatlantic
privacy conflicts in the public sector that sets them off from conflicts involving
market regulation. As Henry Farrell and Abe Newman have argued, the U.S.–EU
disputes over PNR and TFTP have not only set the EU against the United States but
have exposed divisions between institutional actors within the EU.89 Ministries of
Home Affairs, represented on the Council, and representatives of the more
conservative political groups in the European Parliament, such as the European
People’s Party, have generally been more favorable to sharing data with the United
States than data-protection authorities and liberal and left-leaning
parliamentarians. Moreover, these pro-security actors have used U.S.–EU
negotiations over PNR and TFTP to leverage more extensive powers for their own
police and intelligence agencies: both PNR and TFTP II include provisions on
reciprocity that require the U.S. authorities to share the data generated by the PNR
and TFTP programs with their European counterparts.90 Furthermore, PNR and
TFTP II have served as a springboard for similar intra-European data-sharing
programs.91 These transatlantic disputes, therefore, both have exposed the
conflicting positions of privacy and security advocates within the EU and have
offered an opportunity for pro-security actors to enhance the EU’s law
87. See, e.g., Letter from Article 29 Working Party to Melissa A. Hartmen, Deputy Assistance Secretary,
Privacy, Transparency and Records, U.S. Department of the Treasury (June 7, 2011); Committee on Civil
Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, European Parliament, Minutes from Meeting of 3 October 2011, from
15.00 to 18.30, and 4 October 2011, from 09.00 to 12.30 and from 15.00 to 18.30, LIBE_PV(2011) 1003_1.
88. See, e.g., Report on Implementation of Agreement, supra note 77, at 5.
89. See Henry Farrell & Abraham Newman, The New Politics of Interdependence: Cross-National
Layering in Trans-Atlantic Regulatory Disputes, 48 COMP. POL. STUD. 1, 10–15 (2014); Abraham Newman,
Transatlantic Flight Fights: Multi-level Governance, Actor Entrepreneurship and International Anti-terrorism
Cooperation, 18 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 481 (2011).
90. 2012 Agreement, supra note 66, at 11 (art. 20); 2010 Agreement, supra note 80, at 10 (arts. 10–
11).
91. See, e.g., Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Use of the
Passenger Name Record Data for the Prevention, Detection, Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorist
Offences and Serious Crime, COM (2011) 32 final (Feb. 2, 2011).
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enforcement and national security capabilities.
III
NSA SURVEILLANCE
The latest chapter in the history of transatlantic disputes over data privacy
began in 2013 with the Edward Snowden leaks of massive NSA surveillance. As
with PNR and SWIFT, the EU–U.S. controversy concerns the activities of
government agencies responsible for national security, but the immense scale of
the NSA programs makes the other two seem fairly inconsequential by
comparison. More than the previous episodes, the NSA’s activities have exposed
rifts not only between the two sides of the Atlantic, but also within Europe,
between security agencies and privacy institutions and between the actual
practice of state security and the formal legal requirements and fundamental
rights that are supposedly applicable against all state actors. As the European
public learned from the Snowden leaks, the NSA has been routinely assisted by its
counterparts in the United Kingdom, France, and other European countries even
though many of the surveillance programs squarely implicate the European right
to personal data protection. This part considers the implications of the NSA
disclosure both for transatlantic relations and for the future evolution of EU
privacy regulation.
A. European Perspectives on the Snowden Leaks
Much is unknown about the programs of mass surveillance carried out by the
NSA and its European counterparts in the last decade. Western governments have
frequently resorted to the state secrecy doctrine to maintain a veil of ignorance
over the general features of intelligence programs.92 However, as a result of the
Snowden leaks and the official and unofficial disclosures that ensued, a series of
basic facts have been clarified and can be assumed uncontroversial.93 Although the
leaks concerned a truly spectacular array of surveillance activities, attention has
focused on two in particular: One program, conducted under Section 215 of the
Patriot Act, which collects the call records of virtually every American;94 and
another, conducted under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
which is targeted at foreigners and has as a result been the main focus of European

92. Interestingly, whereas the U.S. government has declassified many documents following the
Datagate, European governments so far have not taken similar steps.
93. See CASPAR BOWDEN, EUR. PARLIAMENT POL’Y DEPT., CITIZENS’ RTS. & CONST. AFF., THE U.S.
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMMES AND THEIR IMPACT ON EU CITIZENS' FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_
en.pdf.
94. See generally PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE TELEPHONE RECORDS
PROGRAM CONDUCTED UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT AND THE OPERATIONS OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT (2014) [hereinafter REPORT ON TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM],
https://www.pclob.gov/library/215-Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf. For a detailed
analysis, see Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 770–76 (2014); David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L
SEC. L. & POL’Y 209 (2014).
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criticism.95
Under Section 702, the U.S. government is authorized to target for surveillance
“non-US persons,” that is, not U.S. citizens or permanent residents, who are
“reasonably believed to be located outside the United States,” in order “to acquire
foreign intelligence information.”96 Unlike traditional foreign intelligence
surveillance, the U.S. government need only certify the believed identity and
location of the target; it is not required to show probable cause that the person is
a lone-wolf terrorist or an agent of a foreign power.97 The NSA uses Section 702
to engage in two main types of electronic surveillance and bulk data collection.
First, with PRISM collection, the government obtains content and metadata from
Internet companies related to a “selector,” such as an e-mail address.98 The kind of
information varies by provider and can include e-mails, videos, social networking
details, and more. Second, with “upstream collection,” the government compels the
assistance of the providers that control the telecommunications backbone over
which communications transmit. Through this device, the government intercepts
communications directly, again based on a “selector.”99 Upstream collection,
unlike PRISM, can include the content of telephone conversations. In addition to
these and similar programs, information has recently surfaced that the NSA,
independently or in cooperation with foreign services, mainly the United Kingdom
Government Communications Headquarters, has engaged in surveillance of EU
institutions, member state embassies, and foreign leaders.100 One example is the
much-discussed interception of Chancellor Merkel’s telephone communications.
Civil society actors, journalists, human rights nongovernmental organizations,
ordinary citizens, and others were outraged to learn of the scale and nature of the
surveillance programs. In contrast, the reaction of European governments was
mixed. On one hand, they repeatedly voiced their strong objections to the U.S.
authorities, as in the case of the alleged wiretapping of Chancellor Merkel’s
telephone;101 on the other hand, they failed to address head-on the leaked
information that implicated European intelligence agencies.102 Indeed, in contrast
with the United States, which has openly admitted the existence of the NSA

95. See generally PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014) [hereinafter
REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE], https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf.
96. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012).
97. BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 32, at 25.
98. See REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE, supra note 95, at 7.
99. Id.
100. See Dieter Deiseroth, Nachrichtendienstliche Überwachung durch US-Stellen in Deutschland –
Rechtspolitischer Handlungsbedarf?, 2013 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSPOLITIK 194; DIDIER BIGO ET AL., NATIONAL
PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE OF PERSONAL DATA IN EU MEMBER STATES AND THEIR COMPATIBILITY WITH EU
LAW
7
(2013)
[hereinafter
NATIONAL
PROGRAMS
FOR
MASS
SURVEILLANCE],
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493032/IPOLLIBE_ET(2013)493032_EN.pdf.
101. See generally Sabine Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Europäer sind nicht Bürger zweiter Klasse im
Datenschutz, 2013 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 481
102. NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 100, at 9–19.
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programs and has confirmed their main features, the member states have so far
failed to give detailed explanations of their surveillance programs and have
maintained the classified status of most of the relevant documents.103
The Snowden leaks and the journalistic and parliamentary inquiries that have
been conducted to date unequivocally demonstrate that several European
intelligence agencies have actively participated in the implementation of the NSA
programs and have themselves collected a vast amount of data and information
subsequently made available, generally on the basis of reciprocity, to their foreign
counterparts.104 In particular, the United Kingdom has cooperated closely with the
NSA, setting up an extremely powerful system of large-scale surveillance.105
According to some allegations, it seems also that the GCHQ infiltrated the Belgian
communication provider Belgacom to collect data on European institutions.106
Such activities are not to be explained only on the basis of the long-lasting U.K.–
U.S. relationship in the field of intelligence—a relationship that is also backed by a
substantial financial contribution from the Unites States to GCHQ.107 Instead, there
is sufficient evidence that the agencies of other European countries, such as
Germany, France, Sweden, and the Netherlands, have carried out similar masssurveillance programs. Among such programs are the direct control of
communications nodes known as “upstreaming,” systematic access to privatesector data, and the use of decryption software.108
The scale and technological sophistication of these programs are probably not
comparable to the U.S. surveillance programs. There is no doubt, however, that
mass surveillance of communications has been carried out by European agencies,
and that in most cases a vast amount of personal data—content data and
metadata—has been made available to their U.S. counterparts.109 From a European
perspective, therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that mass surveillance is by
no means a solely U.S. issue. It also raises the question, again from a European
viewpoint, of the legal basis and legitimacy of both the EU and U.S. surveillance
operations, discussed next.

103. Id.; Stefan Heumann, Die NSA in aller Munde—und was ist mit dem BND?, CARTA (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.carta.info/66295/die-nsa-in-aller-munde-und-was-ist-mit-dem-bnd/;
Working
Party,
Working Document on Surveillance of Electronic Communications for Intelligence and National Security
Purposes, at 9 (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Working Document], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp228_en.pdf.
104. For a detailed analysis, see NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 100, at Annex
1.
105. This program is code-named TEMPORA and consists of the routine interception of submarine
cables, with the aim of gaining knowledge of the content of Internet communications. See id. at 51.
106. Belgacom Attack: Britain's GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecoms Firm, DER SPIEGEL (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a923406.html.
107. Nick Hopkins & Julian Borger, Exclusive: NSA Pays £100m in Secret Funding for GCHQ, THE
GUARDIAN, (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spyingedward-snowden; See NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 100, at 54–55.
108. Id. at 19–26.
109. Working Document, supra note 103, at 9.
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B. The Lawfulness of U.S. Surveillance
The Section 702 program has attracted significant criticism in Europe. As
discussed earlier in the analysis of PNR and TFTP II, there are several different
types of privacy guarantees generally believed to be important under European
law: transparency, individual access and correction, accuracy, security, oversight,
and proportionality. As in the earlier transatlantic privacy disputes, the European
reaction has been partly driven by the argument that these standards have not
been met. It is obviously impossible and undesirable to ensure complete
transparency, individual access and correction, and oversight in the area of
intelligence gathering, but the degree of freedom afforded to surveillance actors
under the Section 702 program has been a source of puzzlement.
Consider first the European constitutional requirement of a basis in law for any
infringement of the right to personal data protection. Although the current version
of the Section 702 program is conducted, unlike earlier versions, pursuant to a
congressional law that sets down different substantive and procedural criteria, the
type of personal information that may be gathered—foreign intelligence
information involving non-U.S. persons located outside of the United States is not
clearly defined.110 As noted in the report of the EU Data Protection Working Party,
“foreign intelligence could, on the face of the provision, include information
concerning the political activities of individuals or groups, or activities of
government agencies, where such activity could be of interest to the United States
for its foreign policy.”111 It could also include activities relevant to U.S. economic
interests.112 The U.S. government, questioned on the exact scope of the notion,
refused to give a detailed answer on the grounds that this would compromise the
efficacy of intelligence activities.113 Moreover, FISA contains no limitation on the
geographical reach of the surveillance, and it therefore could, in principle, cover
not only the operations of service providers in the United States, but also data
stored in the cloud and data processed by subsidiaries of U.S. companies located
in the EU.
Turning to the safeguards afforded by judicial oversight, at first blush they
appear substantial when compared with Europe’s corresponding judicial
safeguards. In many European systems, oversight is conducted by special
parliamentary committees or executive bodies, and does not contemplate a role
for the courts. By contrast, under FISA, a special court comprised of ordinary
110. For a detailed analysis of the history and content of Section 702, see LIBERTY AND SECURITY, supra
note 29, at 130.
111. Report on the Findings by the EU Co-Chairs of the Ad Hoc EU–US Working Group on Data Protection,
at 4 (Nov. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Report], http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/reportfindings-of-the-ad-hoc-eu-us-working-group-on-data-protection.pdf.
112. The President, however, has stated that the collection of foreign commercial information is not
authorized for purposes of affording a commercial advantage to U.S. companies. Office of the Press Sec’y,
Presidential Policy Directive—Signals Intelligence Activities, § 1(c), WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 17, 2014) [hereinafter
PPD-28],
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/presidential-policy-directivesignals-intelligence-activities.
113. Id.
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judges (the FISA Court) supervises intelligence surveillance. In the context of
Section 702, however, the powers of the FISA Court are relatively limited: it only
approves the type of foreign intelligence information being collected, the targeting
procedures used by the NSA to conclude that surveillance will lead to the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information on a non-U.S. person outside of the
United States, and the minimization procedures used to prevent the collection and
use of information on U.S. persons.114 In contrast with traditional FISA
surveillance, the FISA Court does not review applications for the surveillance of
specific individuals.115 Furthermore, the FISA Court’s orders are classified and
companies that are required to cooperate with the NSA, under the authority of the
orders, are bound to secrecy. As a result, there is no way for data subjects to be
informed that their personal data are being collected or processed.116 Relatedly,
individuals have no right to obtain access, rectification, or erasure of data, and the
prospect of administrative or judicial redress is virtually nonexistent. The
difficulty of obtaining a judicial remedy, absent a criminal prosecution based on
unlawfully acquired evidence, was confirmed in Clapper v. Amnesty International
USA.117 In that case, the Supreme Court found that the petitioners—human rights
lawyers and others who communicated with clients abroad—did not have
standing because the claim that their telephone communications were likely to be
intercepted was “too speculative.”118
NSA surveillance has also raised proportionality issues familiar from the
previous rounds of transatlantic conflict. One feature of the surveillance programs
that has attracted much attention is the lack of protection for metadata.119 In the
context of the Section 215 call records program, the U.S. government has
confirmed that the NSA collects call metadata from all major telecommunications
companies and maintains a database of all such calls for five years.120 This is done
irrespective of the safeguards formally set forth by the Fourth Amendment—
judicial warrant and probable cause—but consistent with the interpretation given
by the Supreme Court in the 1970s, according to which there is no “reasonable
expectation of privacy” for personal data entrusted to a third party.121 As explained
at the beginning of this article, the EU takes the opposite approach: metadata is
considered “personal data” and therefore must be collected and processed
according to the general principles of data-protection law. 122 Another anomaly
114. REPORT ON SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE, supra note 95, at 26–27.
115. See L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security Exception: Its History and Limits,
66 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1399 (2013).
116. See Report, supra note 111, at 16; Sudha Setty, Surveillance, Secrecy, and the Search for Meaningful
Accountability, 51 STAN. J. INT’L L. 69, 82–84 (2015).
117. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
118. See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).
119. See generally Bryce Clayton Newell, The Massive Metadata Machine: Liberty, Power and Secret Mass
Surveillance in the U.S. and Europe, 9 J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 481 (2014).
120. See Report, supra note 111, at 11; REPORT ON TELEPHONE RECORDS PROGRAM, supra note 94, at 25;
Kris, supra, note 94, at 221. The program was amended by Congress in June 2015, but the retention period
was not modified.
121. See European versus American Liberty, supra note 34, at 624.
122. See Malone v. U.K., 7 Eur. Ct. H.R. 14 (1984); see also Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v.
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with respect to European law is how privacy principles are applied to bulk
collection. The U.S. intelligence community takes the position that the acquisition
of personal data does not amount, in and of itself, to “processing”; data are
processed only at the moment when they are analyzed by a human being.123 In
other words, the default position in U.S. national security law is that privacy
concerns arise only when the information is accessed by a human being. This view
stands in contrast with European law, under which the right to personal dataprotection is triggered at the moment of collection, and facilitates more extensive
bulk collection than is contemplated under European law.
In addition to these well-known transatlantic differences, the Snowden leaks
have introduced a new bone of contention in transatlantic privacy relations—the
dramatic difference in U.S. law between the treatment of citizens and non-citizens.
Even more than PNR and TFTP, the NSA programs have brought into sharp focus
the two-track scheme that runs throughout U.S. privacy law and that results in
relatively few guarantees for EU citizens.124 This is particularly apparent under
Section 702.125 The surveillance authorized under Section 702 is directed at
foreign citizens who are not legal residents and who are believed to be located
outside the United States.126 A corollary of this basic mission is that most of the
limitations contained in Section 702 seek to protect U.S. persons from being swept
up in foreign intelligence surveillance.127 The targeting and minimization
procedures subject to the approval of the FISA Court are aimed at protecting the
privacy of U.S. persons, not foreign citizens. This two-track scheme also marks U.S.
constitutional law. All government surveillance must respect the privacy
guarantees contained in the Fourth Amendment, but the Supreme Court has held
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to nonresident aliens located
abroad.128 In other words, most of the EU citizens implicated by NSA surveillance
Minister for Communc’s, Marine and Natural Res., 2014 E.C.R (2014).
123. See Report, supra note 111, at 9.
124. See generally BIGNAMI, THE US LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 32, at 36.
125. See Konrad Lachmayer & Normann Witzleb, The Challenge to Privacy From Ever-Increasing State
Surveillance: A Comparative Perspective, 37 U.N.S.W. L.J. 748, 764 (2014); LIBERTY AND SECURITY, supra note
29.
126. See LIBERTY AND SECURITY, supra note 29, at 135.
127. See Christopher Kuner, Foreign Nationals and Privacy Protection: A Comparative Transatlantic
Analysis, in DATA PROTECTION ANNO 2014: HOW TO RESTORE TRUST?: CONTRIBUTIONS IN HONOUR OF PETER
HUSTINX, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR (2004–2014) 213 (Hielke Hijmans & Herke Kranenborg
eds., 2014).
128. According to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
265–68 (1990), the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee rights for non-U.S. persons outside the United
States. Rather, the Fourth Amendment protects the rights of “the people,” that is, “a class of persons who
are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country
to be considered part of that community.” Applying this model, several scholars have argued that the
Fourth Amendment is not implicated by the mass-surveillance of foreign communications carried out by
the NSA. See John Yoo, The Legality of National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 919 (2014); Judith Rauhofer & Caspar Bowden, Protecting Their Own: Fundamental
Rights Implications for EU Data Sovereignty in the Cloud 23–25 (Univ. of Edinburgh Sch. of Law, Research
Paper Series No. 2013/28), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2283175 (referencing
the personal data of foreigners stored by U.S. based cloud computing providers).
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have no privacy rights under the U.S. Constitution.
To be fair, many, if not most, countries operate with surveillance laws that
afford heightened privacy protections to their own citizens. For example, German
law authorizes its intelligence services to carry out surveillance only on
telecommunications connections that are not regularly used by German citizens,
thereby treating non-Germans less favorably.129 What is more exceptional is the
denial of any human rights protection for foreigners. Many constitutions and
international treaties—including Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the United States is party—protect privacy
as a human right vested in all persons.130 Thus the constitutional jurisprudence of
countries like Germany does not draw a categorical difference between the rights
afforded to citizens and foreigners. A number of European commentators have
argued that because the United States permits the virtually unrestricted
surveillance of the communications of foreigners located outside of its territory, it
violates its human rights obligations under the ICCPR.131
The extraterritorial application of human rights treaties is a controversial issue
and it is not easy to predict how it will be resolved in the field of mass
surveillance.132 On this scope issue, however, as on the substance of privacy rights,
there are significant differences between the United States and Europe. The United
States has traditionally argued that under the ICCPR states are only responsible
for human rights violations on their own territory, not extraterritorially.133 By
contrast, the European approach is somewhat more flexible. The European
Convention of Human Rights, which is framed in different terms than the ICCPR,
has been applied by the ECtHR and the Commission of Human Rights in cases of
extraterritorial violations of human rights.134 To avoid irrational or unfeasible
results, the ECtHR has limited the obligation of the member states to respect the
rights guaranteed by the Convention to two main situations: First, the spatial
model, which is the de facto effective control over an area;135 and second, the
personal jurisdiction model, or the exercise of authority and control over an

129. Kuner, supra note 127, at 13.
130. See G.A. Res. 68/167 (Jan. 21, 2014); High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right to Privacy
in the Digital Age: Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, at 6, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014).
131. See Wolfgang Ewer & Tobias Thienel, Völker-, unions- und verfassungsrechtliche Aspekte des NSADatenskandals, 2014 NJW 30, 32; Markus Kotzur, Datenschutz als Menschenrecht?, 2013 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR
RECHTSPOLITIK 216, 218; see also Ilina Georgieva, The Right to Privacy under Fire – Foreign Surveillance
under the NSA and the GCHQ and Its Compatibility with Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 8 ECHR, 31 Utrecht J. Int’l &
Europ. L. 104, 124 (2015).
132. On the general issue of extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, see MARKO MILANOVIC,
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 7–9 (2011).
133. Marko Milanovic, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56
HARV. INT. L.J. 81, 102–08 (2015); see also Beth Van Schaack, The United States’ Position on the
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now Is the Time for Change, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 20,
22–34 (2014).
134. See generally Milanovic, supra note 133; THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS § 1.4.3.M (Pieter Van Dijk et al. eds., 2006).
135. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995).
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individual.136 If such jurisdictional criteria are satisfied, then a state in question
may be answerable even for extraterritorial violations.
The ECtHR’s approach to extraterritoriality has been developed mainly
regarding cases concerning the infringement of the right to life, liberty, and
personal integrity.137 Applying it to interferences with privacy is a difficult task,
largely because such interferences are typically incorporeal and do not require the
exercise of physical powers over the person. To gain traction over the issue, it is
useful to distinguish, following a suggestion by Marko Milanovic, among three
different factual scenarios: (1) The surveillance is carried out on the state’s own
territory and the target is located inside the national borders; (2) the surveillance
is carried out, or the resulting data are processed, on the state’s own territory but
the target is located abroad;138 and (3) the person is located abroad and the
interference with privacy takes place outside the state’s own territory. Under the
ECtHR’s spatial model of jurisdiction, one could argue that both the first and
second scenarios justify the application of the Convention.139
The third situation is more problematic because it is not covered by the spatial
model, and even under the personal model, it is not clear whether the interception
of communications or the bulk collection of metadata would qualify as an exercise
of “authority or control” over an individual. Milanovic has recently argued that the
right to privacy under the ECHR should be applied extraterritorially in this third
situation as well, noting that it would be irrational to treat differently factual
situations that involve the same set of substantive problems.140 The interferences
with privacy under the Section 702 program, however, do not appear to trigger
this more complex scenario but rather seem to fall under the second scenario,
given that both PRISM collection and upstream collection take place on U.S.
territory.141 One could argue, therefore, that if personal data of European citizens
are collected and processed by the NSA without complying with the procedural
and substantive requirements of Article 17 of the ICCPR, the overall situation
would be highly asymmetrical: American citizens would be protected by Article 8
of the European Convention of Human Rights (with respect to surveillance carried
out by European intelligence and police authorities), whereas Europeans would
not enjoy similar guarantees vis-à-vis surveillance by U.S. authorities.
In addition to the discriminatory application of privacy rights, another novel
136. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18, para. 137 (2011). The Court
stated:
It is clear that, whenever the State through its agents exercises control and authority over an
individual, and thus jurisdiction, the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that
individual the rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the
situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be ‘divided and
tailored.’
Id.
137. See generally Milanovic, supra note 133, at 37–48.
138. For a similar case, see Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, 2006-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1173 (2006).
139. See Milanovic, supra note 133, at 60.
140. Id. at 60–61.
141. See generally BOWDEN, supra note 93, at 13–24.
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element of the current transatlantic dispute involves the methods that have been
used by the NSA to gather intelligence on Europeans. The first part of this article
described two official channels through which the U.S. government can obtain
personal data on Europeans—pursuant to the PNR agreement and to the TFTP II
agreement. There also exists the Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement between the
EU and United States, which makes it possible, under certain conditions, to gather
and exchange data for the prevention and investigation of criminal activities,
including international terrorism.142 In the eyes of some European commentators,
the U.S. authorities have deliberately circumvented these official channels by
collecting data directly from private service providers, an action they claim might
even amount to a violation of international law.
C. The Lawfulness of European Surveillance
As mentioned above, according to initial reports, it appears that some of the
largest European intelligence agencies, including those of England, France, and
Germany, have actively cooperated with the NSA and have collected and probably
exchanged large amounts of personal data on European citizens, including many
who have never been the object of a counterterrorism or criminal investigation.143
This has revealed the rift, discussed earlier in the context of PNR and TFTP II,
between different European actors. Although data-protection authorities and
certain liberal political parties have championed privacy rights,144 they have
always met with powerful resistance from the forces of law and order, and in
particular, the national security establishment. The allegations of mass data
collection and processing by European intelligence services also raise the question
of whether a gap exists between the law on the books and the actual operation of
state activities: Have the principles of European data-protection law been
violated? Various complaints have already been lodged both before national and
supranational courts,145 but even at this early stage it is possible to clarify some
general points.
At the outset, it should be noted that the legal framework governing the various
intelligence programs is highly fragmented. As a policy area, national security falls
outside the competences of the EU and is reserved for the member states.146 The
142. See Letter from EU Vice-President Viviane Reding to U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, at 2 (June 10,
2013), http://edri.org/files/holder.pdf.
143. For a detailed overview, see generally NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 100.
144. See, e.g., Working Document, supra note 103; Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 04/2014 on
Surveillance of Electronic Communications for Intelligence and National Security Purposes (Apr. 10 2014)
[hereinafter
Opinion
04],
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2014/wp215_en.pdf.
145. The ECtHR has affirmed the admissibility of the case Big Brother Watch v. U.K., App. No. 58170/13
(2013); see also Liberty v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UKIPTrib 13_77-H
(2015) (declaring the regime that governs the sharing between Britain and the United States of electronic
communications intercepted in bulk was unlawful for breach of Art. 8 ECtHR prior to the disclosures made
during the court proceedings). Also particularly relevant is the recent decision of the CJEU, Grand Chamber,
is Case 362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner (2015), discussed below.
146. Treaty on European Union Art. 4(2), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326); see also Opinion 04, supra
note 144, at 6–7.
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laws regulating the powers, internal organization, and responsibilities of
intelligence and security agencies, as well as oversight mechanisms, tend to vary
significantly among different European countries.147
Notwithstanding this diversity, a number of general principles can be derived
from the European constitutional framework and from the harmonized European
law of data protection. Because the European Convention on Human Rights
governs all the activities of European states, including national security
surveillance, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is the most clearly applicable body of
law. As explained earlier, the right to privacy under Article 8 of the Convention is
triggered whenever public or private bodies gather information that can be
associated with a person. For processing to be lawful, there must be a basis in law,
a clearly defined purpose set down in that law, and proportionality. The Court has
adapted these general requirements to the specific context of surveillance by
national intelligence services in what, by now, constitutes a fairly substantial line
of jurisprudence.
First, in the 1978 case of Klass and Others v. Germany,148 the Court held that any
person whose communications are likely being monitored under a secret
intelligence program, even if it cannot be shown that he or she was actually a
victim of surveillance, has standing to sue.149 In other words, an application is
considered admissible even in the absence of concrete evidence of harm. As the
Court observed in Weber and Saravia v. Germany:
[T]he mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of
communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may
be applied. This threat necessarily strikes at freedom of communication between users
of the telecommunications services, and thereby amounts to an interference with the
exercise of the applicants’ rights under Article 8, irrespective of any measures actually
taken against them.150

This relatively permissive test for obtaining standing contrasts with the United
States Supreme Court’s position, affirmed in Clapper, that the mere threat of
surveillance does not establish standing.151
Once the Court finds that the surveillance in question amounts to an
interference with the right to privacy under Article 8, it examines whether the
interference is provided for by the law and is necessary in a democratic society to

147. See DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POLICIES, PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF SECURITY AND
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (2011). A complete legal analysis, therefore, would require
proceeding jurisdiction by jurisdiction, something which would exceed the scope of this article.
148. Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1978).
149. Id. §§ 34–38 (laying down the principle according to which “an individual may, under certain
conditions, claim to be the victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures or of
legislation permitting secret measures, without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to
him. The relevant conditions are to be determined in each case according to the Convention right or rights
alleged to have been infringed, the secret character of the measures objected to, and the connection
between the applicant and those measures”).
150. Weber v. Germany, App. No. 54934/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. § 78 (2006) [hereinafter Weber Decision]
(emphasis added).
151. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
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achieve the aims mentioned in Article 8 (2) of the Convention.152 Roughly
speaking, “provided for by law” maps onto the legal basis and purpose
requirements discussed in the first part of this article, whereas “necessary in a
democratic society” tracks this article’s proportionality analysis.
In the context of intelligence operations, the Court has repeatedly stated that
the “law” authorizing secret surveillance programs must “be accessible to the
person concerned, who must, moreover, be able to foresee its consequences for him,
and compatible with the rule of law.”153 To understand the Court’s jurisprudence,
it is useful to reproduce in full the following passage on foreseeability, applicable
both to the interception of individual communications and to mass electronic
surveillance programs:
[F]oreseeability in the special context of secret measures of surveillance, such as the
interception of communications, cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee
when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his
conduct accordingly . . . [h]owever, especially where a power vested in the executive is
exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident . . . [i]t is therefore essential to
have clear, detailed rules on interception of telephone conversations, especially as the
technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated . . . . The domestic
law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the
circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to
resort to any such measures . . . . [T]he law must indicate the scope of any such discretion
conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity
to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference. In its case-law on
secret measures of surveillance, the Court has developed the following minimum
safeguards that should be set out in statute law in order to avoid abuses of power: the
nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the
categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of
telephone tapping; the procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data
obtained; the precautions to be taken when communicating the data to other parties; and
the circumstances in which recordings may or must be erased or the tapes destroyed.154

Applying this jurisprudence on the “law” required to authorize the interference
with the privacy right, the ECtHR held against the United Kingdom in Liberty v. The
United Kingdom.155 The Strasbourg Court found that the 1985 Act authorizing the
interception of communications passing between the United Kingdom and an
external receiver violated Article 8 for the following three reasons: (1) There was
no limit on the type of external communications that could be included in a
warrant; (2) the Act allowed the State authorities broad discretion on the question
of which communications, out of the total volume of those physically captured,
would be read or listened to; and( 3) the procedures to be followed in selecting
specific communications for examination, sharing, storing, and destroying were
not set out in a manner accessible to the public.156 A similar conclusion was
reached in the subsequent case of Iordachi v. Moldova.157
Moving to the second part of the inquiry—whether the interference is
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Weber Decision, supra note 150, at § 80.
Id. at § 84.
Id. §§ 93–95 (emphasis added)
Liberty v. U.K., App. No. 58243/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. §§ 64–70 (2008).
Id. §§ 64–69.
Iordachi v. Moldova, App. No. 25198/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
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necessary in a democratic society—the Strasbourg Court has repeatedly affirmed
that secret surveillance measures, although seriously interfering with the right to
respect of private life, may be considered admissible insofar as they are aimed at
protecting national security.158 The member states, however, are not allowed
unlimited discretion in designing such programs: “in view of the risk that a system
of secret surveillance for the protection of national security may undermine or
even destroy democracy under the cloak of defending it,” governments are
required to put in place “adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.”159 With
this requirement, the Court imposes a classic proportionality test, which must take
into consideration “all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature, scope and
duration of the possible measures; the grounds required for ordering them; the
authorities competent to authorize, carry out and supervise them; and the kind of
remedy provided by the national law.”160
To illustrate the application of these principles, in the case of Weber and Others
v. Germany, the ECtHR came to the conclusion that the German program that
permitted the wiretapping of international telephone calls for purposes of
counterterrorism, the so-called G-10 Act, as modified by the Fight against Crime
Act of 28 October 1994,161 satisfied both of Article 8’s requirements of “law” and
being “necessary in a democratic society.” The law defined in a clear and precise
manner the offenses that could give rise to an interception order, the duration of
the interception, the categories of persons likely to be intercepted, the maximum
duration of monitoring measures, the procedure to be followed for examining and
using the data, and the circumstances in which recordings could be erased or tapes
destroyed.162
An analysis of TEMPORA, one of the most intrusive and sophisticated of the
national security programs revealed by Snowden, sheds light on how these
principles might be applied to mass surveillance. There are two primary
components to the program. First, it appears that the GCHQ has been allowed to
access, in secret and without controls, the personal data pertaining to U.K. citizens
gathered by the NSA under the Section 702 program.163 If this is confirmed, then
such an activity would amount to a circumvention of the Regulation of
Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which requires the government to adopt specified
safeguards when intercepting communications of individuals located in the United
Kingdom. Without a detailed and accessible legal basis, and in the absence of any

158. Weber Decision, supra note 150, § 106; see also Klass v. Germany, App. No. 5029/71, Eur. Ct. H.R.
§ 49 (1978).
159. Weber Decision, supra note 150, at § 106.
160. Id.
161. Act of 13 August 1968 on Restrictions on the Secrecy of Mail, Post and Telecommunications
(Gesetz_zur Beschränkung des_Brief-, Post- und_Fernmeldegeheimnisses), as modified by the Fight against
Crime Act of 28 October 1994 (Verbrechensbekämpfungsgesetz). See Matthias Bäcker, Das G 10 und die
Kompetenzordnung, 2011 DÖV 840.
162. Weber Decision, supra note 150, at § 92.
163. NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 100, at 53, 55.
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“adequate and effective guarantee against abuse,”164 it is difficult to see how such
an interference with private life could be considered legitimate by the Strasbourg
Court. Second, it has been reported that the GCHQ has intercepted more than 200
fiber optic cables landing in the United Kingdom, storing and extracting data
related to “external communications” of primarily non-U.K. citizens. The
intercepted communications include both the content and metadata of telephone
calls and internet traffic, such as e-mails, Facebook entries, and Google searches.
Although authorized under certificated warrants issued pursuant to section 8(4)
of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, this surveillance seems to be
disproportionate insofar as the bulk interception of communications on a
continuous and indiscriminate basis comprises blanket surveillance of thousands
and possibly of millions of people.165 Additionally, U.S. officials have allegedly been
granted extensive access to this data, again in the absence of a clear and
transparent legal basis.166
Will the European courts rule against the mass surveillance programs carried
out by several national agencies, allegedly in collaboration with the NSA? Although
it is hard to tell at the moment, some indications suggest that they might. In 2013,
the ECtHR, following a preliminary examination of its admissibility, decided to give
priority, under rule 41, to the application lodged by Big Brother Watch and Others
(a coalition of nongovernmental organizations engaged with the protection of
privacy and other civil liberties) against the United Kingdom.167 The applicants
have complained that the TEMPORA program, analyzed above, has no adequate
basis in domestic law and is not proportionate under Article 8 of the Convention.168
The Court of Justice of the European Union has also recently taken a more
categorical approach to privacy. Since the Snowden revelations, the Court has
decided three important data-protection cases: Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister of
Communications Ireland and others,169 Google Spain v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos and Mario Costeja González,170 and Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner.171 All bear witness to the Court’s hardening stance on the right to
personal data protection.The judgments also demonstrate considerable attention
164. Weber Decision, supra note 150, at § 106.
165. TEMPORA was challenged before the United Kingdom Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The
Tribunal held in favor of one of the claimants (an Egyptian nongovernmental organization), on the basis of
a breach of Article 8 of the ECHR, in light of the exceedingly long time of retention of the intercepted data.
See Liberty v. Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UKIPTrib 13_77-H (2015) As
regards the other claimants, the Tribunal held that the sharing of information between the U.S. and Britain
in the frame of the PRISM and TEMPORA programs was in breach of Art. 8 ECHR, because the domestic law
was not sufficiently transparent and accessible to the public, prior to the disclosures made during the court
proceedings. Id.
166. NATIONAL PROGRAMS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE, supra note 100, at 55.
167. Big Brother Watch v. U.K., App. No. 58170/13, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013).
168. The
complaint
is
available
at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/bbw_org_ep_ck_v_uk_/bbw_
org_ep_ck_v_uk_en.pdf.
169. Case C-293/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communic’s, Marine and Natural Res.,
2014 E.C.R (2014).
170. Case-131/12 (2014) (not yet reported).
171. Case-362/14 (2015) (not yet reported).

130

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol.78:4

to the extraterritorial dimension of the policy problem and the challenges of
safeguarding the right in the face of market and government surveillance that
occurs within other jurisidictions, particularly the United States. And lurking in
the background, or in the case of Schrems, squarely on the face of the judgment, is
the deeply troubling policy problem that has been brought to the fore by the
Snowden revelations: How can privacy be protected in the face of unprecedented
advances in digital technologies, the growing concentration of power and personal
data in the hands of market actors, and the seemingly unlimited appetite for that
data among law enforcement, national security, and other government actors?172
On April 8, 2014, in Digital Rights Ireland v. Minister of Communications
Ireland and others, the CJEU found that Directive 2006/24/EC was invalid.173 The
so-called Data Retention Directive required electronic communication providers
to collect and retain all traffic and location data of all their clients concerning fixed
telephony, mobile telephony, Internet access, Internet e-mail and Internet
telephony for a period between six months and two years. These metadata were
to be made available “for the purpose of the investigation, detection and
prosecution of serious crime.”174 The CJEU found the Directive incompatible with
Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,
which respectively enshrine the right to privacy and the right to personal data
protection.
In Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU reasoned that the interference with
privacy was particularly serious because of the huge quantity and type of data
involved, together with the fact that the data were retained and subsequently used
without any knowledge of the data subject. In the view of the CJEU, the dataretention requirement was “likely to generate in the minds of the persons
concerned the feeling that their private lives are the subject of constant
surveillance.”175 In the judgment, the CJEU acknowledged that the objectives of the
Directive were of the utmost importance, being related to the fight against
organized crime and terrorism176 but found that the interference with privacy was
not proportionate to the legitimate aims being pursued. To reach this conclusion,
the Court assigned particular relevance to the following elements: (1) The data
retention program applied to all persons without limitations, and even to persons
“for whom there is no evidence capable of suggesting that their conduct might
have a link, even an indirect or remote one, with serious crime;” (2) the program
covered all data, irrespective of any relationship between such data and a threat
to public security; (3) the Directive set down no substantive and procedural
conditions to regulate access to and use of the data by the competent national
authorities; (4) such access was not made dependent “on a prior review carried
172. On the underlying social and technological context and its transformation, see Fred H. Cate et al.,
Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 195 (2012); Richards, supra
note 118, at 1936–41.
173. Digital Rights Ireland Ltd., supra note 168.
174. Id. at § 16.
175. Id. at § 37.
176. Id. at § 51.
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out by a court or by an independent administrative body whose decision seeks to
limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary;” and (5) the
retention period was fixed in general terms, between six months and two years,
without a distinction being made among the different types of data and without
employing criteria designed to guarantee that the retention period be limited to
what was strictly necessary in light of the aims pursued.177
The CJEU also pointed to another flaw in the Data Retention Directive: it did
not prohibit the retention of the metadata outside of the European Union,
with the result that it cannot be held that the control, explicitly required by Article 8(3)
of the Charter, by an independent authority of compliance with the requirements of
protection and security, as referred to in the two previous paragraphs, is fully ensured.
Such a control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is an essential component of the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.178

The danger alluded to—transferring data to less privacy-protective
jurisdictions—could be very well be interpreted as a specific reference to NSA
surveillance.
Only one month after Digital Rights Ireland, the CJEU handed down its
judgment in Google Spain. There the CJEU found Google liable for violating the socalled right-to-be-forgotten in the EU Data Protection Directive. 179 That right is
linked to the right of individual access and correction, discussed earlier in this
article, and requires that firms like Google expunge from their computer systems
personal information that fails to comply with data-protection standards such as
accuracy and proportionality. In a critical part of the judgment, the Court found in
favor of broad territorial application of the EU Directive to ensure that European
data-protection rights could not be circumvented by processing personal data
outside the EU.180 Even though Google argued that the EU Directive was not
applicable because all the data processing connected with its search engine
occurred in the the United States, the CJEU found that a corporate presence in the
EU for purposes of selling advertising space was enough to bring Google within the
territorial scope of the Directive.
The last in this trilogy of data-protection cases is Schrems v. Data Protection
Commissioner. In the wake of the NSA scandal, an Austrian citizen and subscriber
of Facebook, Maximilian Schrems, lodged a complaint before the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner. He claimed that Facebook Ireland systematically
transferred the data of its European customers to Facebook USA’s servers in the
United States, where they were stored. Facebook was a participant in the Safe
Harbor program and therefore, as explained earlier in this article, was entitled to
a finding of adequacy for purposes of satisfying the requirements of the EU Data
Protection Directive on data transfers to third countries. Schrems, however, relied
on the Snowden revelations of Facebook’s involvement in the PRISM program
(which allows the NSA access to the data of EU citizens held by Internet
177. Id. at §§ 51–68.
178. Id. at § 68.
179. Case-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (2014) (not yet
reported).
180. Id. § 54.
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companies) to argue that the transfers violated the substantive and procedural
guarantees of the Directive and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
(Articles 7 and 8). When the Data Protection Commissioner refused to take action,
Schrems challenged the Commissioner’s decision in Irish court, which in turn
referred the issue to the CJEU.
The CJEU held in favor of Schrems, against Safe Harbor. Although the
judgment touches on a number of issues, the most important one for purposes of
this article is the question of whether adherence to the Safe Harbor principles
guarantees the adequacy of data protection for European data transferred to the
United States. The Court’s answer was a resounding “No.” The Court faulted the
Safe Harbor agreement and the accompanying Commission decision on adequacy
for including a broad exception for U.S. government access to personal data based
on “national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements” or based
on “statute, government regulation, or case-law.”181 In assessing adequacy, the
Commission had focused exclusively on the private sector and had failed to assess
whether the legal standards applicable to government actors were comparable to
those under EU data-protection law.182
After pointing out these flaws in the Commission’s decision, the Court set
down the criteria that would have to be satisfied for the United States to be
considered an adequate jurisdiction. These criteria are grounded on the legal basis
and purpose, as well as proportionality, requirements that have been central to
this area of constitutional law since the early 1970s and that have already been
discussed in the context of the German Constitutional Court and the ECtHR. The
Court found that indiscriminate access to electronic data, in particular the content
of communications, would violate the essence of the right to privacy. Any law
serving as the basis for a interference with the right to privacy would have to
include “objective criterion . . . to determine the limits of the access of the public
authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are specific,
strictly restricted and capable of justifying the interference.”183 In addition, the
right of access, correction, and in some cases, erasure, would have to be
enforceable through the courts.184 Since the Commission made no such findings,
the Court held that the Safe Harbor adequacy determination was invalid.
IV
CONCLUSION
The revelations of NSA surveillance are but the last, albeit perhaps the most
dramatic, episode in transatlantic privacy regulation. Whatever one might think of
the NSA programs, they have undoubtedly had repercussions for privacy and
transatlantic relations more broadly speaking. In July 2013, the European
Parliament passed a Resolution calling for an official investigation into the NSA
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. §§ 84–87
Id. §§ 88–90.
Id. § 93.
Id. § 95.
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programs and instructed its Parliamentary Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice,
and Home Affairs to conduct an in-depth inquiry into the matter.185 After six
months of intense activity, on January 8, 2014, the Rapporteur Claude Moraes
published a Draft Report that called for a Parliament Resolution condemning the
programs of indiscriminate surveillance of citizens and proposing a complex
package of reforms aimed at improving privacy safeguards.186 The Report,
approved by the European Parliament on March 12, 2014, demonstrates the
climate of distrust created by the NSA programs. This climate has compromised
some of the arduous efforts of the past decades to overcome regulatory differences
and create a harmonized privacy scheme to facilitate transatlantic trade and to
improve cooperation on security and law enforcement. The Parliament Report
called for immediate suspension of Safe Harbor and, as discussed above, a year
later, the Court of Justice invalidated the Commission decision granting “adequate”
data-protection status to those U.S. firms that subscribe to the Safe Harbor
principles. Even earlier, in October 2013, the Parliament passed a resolution
advocating suspension of TFTP II.
There have also been consequences for transatlantic trade relations more
broadly speaking. The 2014 Parliament Report called for the suspension of the
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement
until the conclusion of negotiations on a transatlantic “Umbrella Agreement”
setting down data-protection guarantees for personal information exchanged for
law enforcement purposes.187 Although Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership Agreement negotiations have gone forward, there is currently a
significant push to also conclude the Umbrella Agreement, without which it is
unlikely that the European Parliament will ratify any trade deal at all. One of the
biggest hurdles to finalizing and ratifying the Umbrella Agreement is the double
standard for U.S. citizens and EU citizens in U.S. law, a double standard that has
been particularly evident in the operation of the Section 702 program.
It would be misleading to portray the European reaction to the Snowden leaks
as unequivocally hostile. The member states and their governments, individually
and through the Council of Ministers, have been fairly silent. Moreover, there have
been numerous attempts by interior ministers and their supporters to enhance
EU-wide surveillance in the interest of fighting the threat of extremism and
terrorism. For instance, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, has
recently urged the European Parliament to pass a longstanding proposal for an EU

185. Resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security Agency Surveillance Program, Surveillance
Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Privacy, 2013/2682 (RSP) (2013),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0322&language=EN.
186. All the relevant documents are collected in LIBE COMMITTEE INQUIRY, ELECTRONIC MASS
SURVEILLANCE OF EU CITIZENS: PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN A DIGITAL AGE (2013–2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201410/20141016ATT91322/20141016AT
T91322EN.pdf.
187. Draft Report on the US NSA Surveillance Programme, Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States
and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Fundamental Rights and on Transatlantic Cooperation in Justice and Home
Affairs
(Jan.
8,
2014),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=//EP//NONSGML+COMPARL+PE-526.085+02+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN.
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PNR that would mimic the system in place in the United States.188 What can be said,
however, is that the vigorous transatlantic debate on privacy can contribute to
protecting both sides from complacency. There is no doubt that personal data
processing can produce, both in the market and the surveillance contexts,
significant benefits. There is also no question that robust privacy guarantees are
necessary and the transatlantic debate has had a positive impact on privacy. As
with many policy issues, the debate on privacy is somewhat lopsided and the
regulatory actors most directly impacted can sometimes use the ebb and flow of
public attention to avoid institutional reform.189 As public outrage over the
Snowden affair fades and government and corporate actors seek to strategically
delay—and perhaps avoid—legal change, the existence of a symbolic set of
fundamental rights and a vocal set of watchdogs in Europe can help sustain
attention to the policy problem and keep privacy reform on the public agenda.

188. Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, Address to the European Parliament, Strasbourg
(Jan. 13, 2015).
189. For the theory of how salience cycles can be used strategically by institutional actors to delay or
prevent change, see GIOVANNI CAPOCCIA, WHEN DO INSTITUTIONS BITE? HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2012) (unpublished typescript) (on file with the University of Oxford).

